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PROTECTING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE
NEXT MILLENNIUM:
SHOULD WE AMEND THE RELIGION
CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION?
Robert P. George*
"ORIGINALISM" AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF RELIGION
The religion clause, or clauses,' of the First Amendment have
been the source of profound interpretative controversy over the past
fifty years or so. Curiously, though, this controversy has taken place
within the context of a rather striking consensus, namely, the view
* Robert P. George is Associate Professor of Politics at Princeton Uni-
versity and a Presidential Appointee to the United Commission on Civil
Rights. He is the author of MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND
PUBLIC MORALrrY (1993) and IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW (forthcoming).
He is a former Justice Tom C. Clark Judicial Fellow at the Supreme Court of
the United States.
1. It is customary to speak of two separate religion clauses of the First
Amendment, viz., the "Free Exercise Clause" and the "Establishment Clause."
Although I shall follow the custom in this essay, I recognize the force of the
challenge advanced against it by Richard John Neuhaus, Mary Ann Glendon,
and others:
There are not two religion clauses. There is but one religion clause.
The stipulation is that "Congress shall make no law," and the rest of
the clause consists of participial modifiers explaining what kind of law
Congress shall not make.... The no-establishment part of the relig-
ion clause is entirely and without remainder in the service of free ex-
ercise. Free exercise is the end; no-establishment is a necessary means
to that end.
Richard John Neuhaus, A New Order of Religious Freedom, FIRST THINGS,
Feb. 1992, at 13, 15. See also Mary Ann Glendon and Raul F. Yanes, Struc-
tural Free Exercise, 90 MICH L. REv. 477, 477 n.6, 540-41 (1991) (stating that
the religion language in the First Amendment "is in the service of a single fun-
damental 'freedom,' the 'free exercise' of religion.").
27
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that interpretation in this area should be guided by the intentions of
the Framers and Ratifiers.
Of course, many people believe that "original intent," or "origi-
nal understanding," should guide constitutional interpretation in all,
or virtually all, areas. Justice Antonin Scalia is a champion of this
view. Whatever the shortcomings of "originalism," he argues, it re-
mains the best-if only in the sense of being the least bad-theory of
constitutional interpretation.2 Perhaps it goes without saying, how-
ever, that many other jurists and scholars reject-even scoff at-
originalism as a comprehensive theory of constitutional
interpretation. The late Justice William J. Brennan, for example,
famously derided originalist constitutional interpretation as
"arrogance cloaked as humility."3
What I find remarkable, however, is that even people such as
Brennan, who reject originalist readings of, for example, the First
Amendment's free speech provision, or the Eighth Amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishments, or the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantees of due process and equal protection, tend nevertheless to
embrace originalism when it comes to the religion clauses.4 They in-
sist that their particular interpretation of the words "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof '5 is correct precisely because it is the inter-
pretation most faithful to the historically recovered intentions of our
nation's founders.6 They generally do not claim that courts have the
authority to revise the religion clauses by way of "creative" interpre-
tation to bring them "up-to-date" or into line with "our" values.
The reason for this, perhaps, is that they believe the Framers and
Ratifiers of the First Amendment really did hold the views they
themselves now hold about religious freedom and the relationship
between church and state. So they are content to treat the matter as
2. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. GiN. L. REV.
849, 862 (1989).
3. William I Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Con-
temporary Ratification, 27 S. TEx. L. REv. 433, 435 (1986).
4. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 642-43 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212-214 (1963).
[Vol. 32:27
November 1998] PROTECTING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
one to be resolved by originalist interpretation, confident the histori-
cal facts will support the judicial imposition of precisely the policies
they prefer.
When it comes to the constitutional law of religion, then, the de-
bate is not about whether interpretation ought to be guided by the
"original understanding."7 Almost everyone agrees that it should be.8
Rather, the debate concerns what the Framers and Ratifiers originally
understood the First Amendment to mean. The debate tends, in other
words, to be about disputed matters of historical fact.
For example, did those who framed and ratified the First
Amendment intend to require, under certain circumstances, judicially
mandated "conduct exemptions" from neutral, general laws whose
incidental effects bear adversely upon the religious beliefs or prac-
tices of certain individuals or groups? In interpreting the "Free Exer-
cise Clause," Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, supported by legal histo-
rians such as Professor Michael McConnell, argues they did.9
However, Justice Scalia, supported by legal historians such as Pro-
fessor Gerard V. Bradley, maintains with equal vigor that they did
not.10 So Justice O'Connor would invalidate as unconstitutional
even a neutral law of general applicability that happens only coinci-
dentally to restrict someone's, or some group's, religious freedom
unless the federal, state, or local government responsible for the law
7. There are, of course, interesting differences among partisans of com-
peting forms of "originalism" in this and other areas of constitutional jurispru-
dence. I will not, however, address these differences here.
8. But see Robert J. Araujo, S. J., A Dialogue Between the Church and
Caesar: A Contemporary Interpretation of the Religion Clauses, 34 B.C. L.
REV. 493, 503 (1993) (discussing the practical difficulties in determining
"original intent"); Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of
the Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 839, 840-45 (1986) (expressing
doubt as to the wisdom of the use of an originalist interpretation in the context
of the religion clauses).
9. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902-03 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Histori-
cal Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409
(1990). See also Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) (criticizing the use of text,
history, and precedent, as well as the logic behind the Smith decision).
10. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878; Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exer-
cise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 245
(1991).
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could meet the burden of showing it (1) is necessary to advance a
compelling governmental interest, and (2) represents the least re-
strictive or intrusive means of advancing that interest." Justice
Scalia, by contrast, would find no violation of the First Amendment's
guarantee of "free exercise" in such a law, though he would have no
constitutional objection to a decision by the relevant government,
acting within its ordinary authority, to carve out exceptions to the
law's general requirements in order to accommodate the free exercise
of religion by those whose beliefs or practices would be impeded or
otherwise adversely affected by the law.'
2
What is true of the "Free Exercise Clause" is also true of the so-
called "Establishment Clause." Did those who framed and ratified
the First Amendment's prohibition of "law[s] respecting an estab-
lishment of religion ' 13 intend to forbid all governmental aid to, or fa-
vor towards, religion? Or did they merely seek to ensure that such
aid or favor is meted out in an evenhanded manner as between differ-
ent religious traditions or communities? Justice John Paul Stevens,
with the blessing of legal historians such as Professor Leonard Levy,
insists that the original understanding of the "Establishment Clause"
requires a wall of separation between church and state which is
breached by any governmental aid to, or favor towards, any particular
religion or religion in general."4 Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
relying on the work of legal historians such as Professor Robert
Cord, maintains that the original understanding permitted and even
encouraged nondiscriminatory favor towards, and equal aid to, re-
ligion.' 5
I agree that the proper approach to interpreting the religion
clauses is originalist. I think that the clauses do what those who
framed and ratified them intended them to do. And I think that
11. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 899 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
12. See id. at 878-90.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 n.37, 60-61 (1985); LEONARD
W. LEvY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE (1986).
15. See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); ROBERT L.
CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: CRISIS IN THE AMERIcAN
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM (1982).
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historical scholarship can help us to recover the more or less straight-
forward-even plain-meaning of the clauses. However, a good ar-
gument can be made-and my goal is to make it-that once the
meaning of the clauses is recovered, it is evident that our constitu-
tional law of religion is in need of reconsideration and, in at least
some respects, revision. I wish to suggest that it is time for "we, the
people" to deliberate anew about how best, as a matter of constitu-
tional law, to protect religious freedom and to structure the relation-
ship between religion and public life.
I shall make two separate arguments. The first concerns the
"free exercise" problem, the second the "establishment" problem.
Although these arguments are partially animated by a common con-
cem, namely, the protection of religious freedom, they are, I believe,
sufficiently independent of each other so that they do not necessarily
stand or fall together. In other words, though I might be right on
both counts or wrong on both counts, it is also possible that I am
wrong on one but right on the other. If this is the case, I suspect that
I am wrong about the need for debate and possible constitutional re-
vision in the free exercise area. I am certainly less confident about
the need for amendment of the "Free Exercise Clause" than I am
about the need for amendment of the "Establishment Clause."
THE "FREE ExERcISE" PROBLEM
In my judgment, Justice Scalia and Professor Bradley win their
debate with Justice O'Connor and Professor McConnell over the
original meaning of the "Free Exercise Clause." While Professor
McConnell does show that various jurisdictions enacted religiously-
based conduct exemptions to neutral laws of general applicability at
the time of our nation's founding, he is unable to demonstrate that
the Founders intended to empower the judiciary to impose such ex-
emptions where legislatures decline to create them.1' So, I think
McConnell's contribution is to establish definitively that where a
legislature wishes to grant a conduct exemption for religiously moti-
vated behavior, there is not necessarily an "Establishment Clause"
impediment to their doing so. But, as Justice Scalia contends, under
16. See McConnell, supra note 9.
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the "Free Exercise Clause" it is up to the legislature, not the judici-
ary, to decide the question of whether to grant an exemption. 17 There
is no free exercise "right" to conduct exemptions. Properly inter-
preted, the "Free Exercise Clause" simply does not vest broad dis-
cretion or policy-making authority in the hands of judges by author-
izing them to decide whether neutral, general laws are supported by a
"compelling interest," or advance such an interest by the "least re-
strictive means."
The "Free Exercise Clause," as originally understood, gives
fairly concrete guidance, but the restraints it places upon legislatures
are modest: they may not ban or impede a religious practice simply
because they do not like it, or because they believe it to be untrue, he-
retical, unenlightened, or whatever. Laws that have the effect of re-
stricting religious freedom must be truly neutral and general to pass
constitutional muster. They must not have as their object the limita-
tion of anyone's religious freedom. Where, however, truly neutral
and general laws happen to have adverse incidental effects on relig-
ious faith or practice, they do not-even presumptively-violate the
"Free Exercise Clause" or authorize courts to mandate conduct
exemptions. If such exemptions are to be granted, it is up to the leg-
islature to grant them.
The Supreme Court has, in recent years, recovered the original
meaning of the "Free Exercise Clause" and demonstrated its willing-
ness to be guided by it in constitutional interpretation. In the 1989
case of Employment Division v. Smith,'8 the Court rejected a claim
by members of the Native American Church who argued, in effect,
that the First Amendment entitled them to a conduct exemption from
Oregon laws forbidding ingestion of peyote. 19 In an opinion by Jus-
tice Scalia, a majority held that the "Free Exercise Clause" simply
does not require states to prove to the satisfaction of judges that their
neutral, general laws are necessary to advance a compelling state in-
terest.20 Although the Court came under ferocious attack from both
the Left and the Right for this holding, it was, I believe, impeccably
faithful to the original meaning of the "Free Exercise Clause."
17. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887, 890 (1990).
18. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
19. See id. at 882.
20. See id. at 882-87.
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There is one feature of Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in
Smith that does strike me as dubious, namely, his attempt to distin-
guish Smith from earlier decisions mandating conduct exemptions
from general laws in Sherbert v. Verner
2 l and Wisconsin v. Yoder.2 u
In my view, these decisions should simply have been reversed.23 In-
stead, the Court preserved them in the legal equivalent of formalde-
hyde: they remain "good law," but for all intents and purposes they
have been stripped of precedential value. Still, the Court was correct
in refusing to follow the Sherbert and Yoder precedents by applying
the "compelling interest" and "least restrictive means" tests to decide
whether to mandate the conduct exemption sought by members of the
Native American Church.24
Now, it is important to see that in saying that Smith was rightly
decided, I am in no way claiming that members of the Native Ameri-
can Church should not be granted a conduct exemption to enable
them lawfully to ingest peyote as part of their religious worship
ceremonies.25 My claim is merely that they have no constitutionally
21. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
22. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
23. It is worth pointing out here that even prior to the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Smith, courts applied the Sherbert and Yoder precedents very nar-
rowly. See, e.g., Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 763
(9th Cir. 1981) (distinguishing Sherbert and Yoder as involving "an absolute
dilemma' and "coercive restraints on religious observation imposed by state
action"); Hatch v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189, 1192 (10th Cir. 1974) (distinguish-
ing Yoder as involving a "sharp contrast [between a local regulation and] a
complete and religiously founded concept of raising children"); United States
v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 1969) (distinguishing Sherbert as in-
volving the imposition of a burden on "a practice which obviously is a cardinal
element in the exercise of a religion"). Although the courts often applied the
"compelling interest" and "least restrictive means" tests, claims to conduct ex-
emptions rarely succeeded. See e.g., Collins, 644 F.2d at 763 (involving the
prohibition of student-led prayer in public schools); Hatch, 502 F.2d at 1192
(involving a school's regulation of students' hair length); Boardman, 419 F.2d
at 113 (involving a requirement to report for work under selective service or-
der).
24. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-89.
25. Nor in saying that Smith was rightly decided am I endorsing the Court's
decision in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). That is another
matter that requires independent treatment going beyond the issues we are dis-
cussing here. For a compelling critique of Boerne, see Michael W. McCon-
nell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores,
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guaranteed-and, thus, judicially enforceable-right to such an ex-
emption. If an exemption is to be granted, the decision as to whether
to grant it is left by the Constitution in the hands of the Oregon leg-
islature, not the federal courts. Someone could believe-in fact, I do
believe-both that the Court was constitutionally correct in refusing
to mandate a conduct exemption and that a just and prudent public
policy would grant such an exemption. Here it is worth mentioning
that, after its victory in the Smith case, the State of Oregon acted leg-
islatively to create a conduct exemption for those who ingest peyote
as part of a bona fide religious ritual.26 So, in the end, the members
of the Native American Church obtained the exemption they
sought-the decision to grant it however, was made not by a judge,
or by a vote of three judges or nine judges, but by the elected repre-
sentatives of the people of Oregon.
When the Smith decision was handed down, critics claimed the
Court had rendered the "Free Exercise Clause" a nullity.z7 Just three
years later, however, this claim was exploded in the case of Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.z8 At issue in
Hialeah were ordinances that prohibited the ritual killing of ani-
mals.29  These ordinances were not truly neutral, general laws.
Rather, they were restrictions on religious practices-associated with
the Santeria religion-which many citizens of Hialeah considered to
be barbaric and offensive.3 ° Seeing the ordinances for what they
were, the justices unhesitatingly, unanimously, and correctly invali-
dated them as violations of the "Free Exercise Clause."31
I have argued that the Court has properly interpreted the "Free
Exercise Clause" in cases like Smith and Hialeah. So why do I sug-
gest the Clause may be in need of amendment?
111 HARV. L. REv. 153 (1997).
26. OR. REV. STAT. § 4 75.992(5)(a) (Supp. 1998).
27. See, e.g., John Delaney, Police Power Absolutism and Nullifying the
"Free Exercise Clause": A Critique of Oregon v. Smith, 25 IND. L. REV. 71
(1991); Michael P. Farris & Jordan W. Lorence, Employment Division v.
Smith and the Need for the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 6 REGENT U.
L. REV. 65 (1995); The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HARV.
L. REv. 129, 198-209 (1990).
28. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
29. See id. at 527-28.
30. See id. at 548-56.
31. See id. at 546-47.
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It could be that the Court has interpreted the Constitution cor-
rectly, but, correctly interpreted, the Constitution is inadequate and in
need of revision. A great many people believe that justice, or, at
least, sound policy for the protection of religious freedom, requires a
constitutional arrangement in which legislation that adversely affects
anyone's religious belief or practice is scrutinized by the judiciary to
ensure that it is, from a public policy viewpoint, absolutely neces-
sary.32 If these people are right, then it is time to amend the Consti-
tution to, in effect, authorize judges to apply the "compelling inter-
est" and "least restrictive means" tests and decide in particular cases
whether there should be conduct exemptions from neutral general
laws.
Now, I myself am doubtful as to whether those advocating judi-
cial decision-making are right. It is certainly wrong to suppose that a
constitutional system that does not authorize judges to grant conduct
exemptions is, in principle, unjust. Like the question of whether to
have a system of constitutional judicial review of legislation at all,
the question of whether judges ought to be able to mandate conduct
exemptions is not one of justice, but of prudence. And I am not at all
certain that it is more prudent to empower judges to grant conduct
exemptions than it is to leave the decision to legislatures. I am, of
course, familiar with the argument that says expansive judicial power
is necessary to protect individuals and minorities-in this case indi-
vidual members of minority faiths-from the depredations of legis-
lative majorities. But the more I think about this argument in the
context of American history, the less I am impressed by it. Nothing
in the record, taken as a whole, ought to incline us to think that
judges are more competent or trustworthy than legislators in resolv-
ing disputed questions of fundamental rights or other issues of moral
consequence, or in striking the proper balance between individual
32. See, e.g., Religious Freedom: Hearing on Congress' Constitutional
Role in Protecting Religious Liberty Before the Comm. on Judiciary of the
United States, 105th Cong. (Oct. 1, 1997), available in 1997 WL 14152193;
Supreme Court Decision on Religious Issues: Protecting Religious Freedom
After City of Boerne v. Flores, written testimony to the Subcomm. on the Con-
stitution, House Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. (July 14, 1997) (written state-
ment of Prof. Thomas J. Berg), available in 1997 WL 11234759.
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freedom and other values to be advanced or protected by legisla-
33tion.
So, in the grand debate I hope we will have over whether to
amend the "Free Exercise Clause," my voice will be on the side of
extreme caution in assessing proposals to expand the power of
unelected and electorally unaccountable judges. If judges are, as
Ronald Dworkin depicts them, the "princes" in "law's empire,"
34
then I am reminded of the biblical warning: "put not thy trust in
princes." 35 Still, I believe the people as a whole, in their sovereign
capacity, should make the decision as to how constitutional law
should be structured in order to protect religious freedom and other
values. Our system for protecting religious freedom should be
33. But see Justice Scalia's concluding remark in his opinion for the Court
in Smith, 494 U.S. at 890, conceding that "leaving accommodation to the po-
litical process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that
are not widely engaged in," but arguing that this is an "unavoidable conse-
quence of democratic government." One possible way of dealing with this
problem is to authorize courts to mandate conduct exemptions for members of
minority faiths (only) where legislatures would have granted conduct exemp-
tions for the same or substantially similar religious practices or religiously mo-
tivated acts-or omissions--engaged in by members of larger or more politi-
cally influential religious groups. So, for example, courts would be authorized
to mandate a conduct exemption for participants in the Native American
Church ceremonies from a general law forbidding the use of peyote, in a case
like Smith, because the Oregon legislature presumably would have granted a
conduct exemption for participants in Jewish and Catholic worship from a
general law prohibiting the use of alcohol. The idea here is that peyote and al-
cohol use are similar in all relevant respects, which is arguably, albeit not cer-
tainly, true. In any event, this approach conceives the problem directly as one
of "equal protection" and only indirectly as a matter of "free exercise."
Good "equal protection" grounds plainly exist even under current law for
judicial intervention where an exemption is given to one religious group but
arbirtrarily denied to another. So, for example, the granting of an exemption
from alcohol prohibition to Jews but not to Catholics would justify "strict
scrutiny." But as soon as even arguably significant differences enter the pic-
ture-for example, mind alteration is not the object, nor is it ordinarily a con-
sequence, of the use of wine in Jewish and Catholic worship; by contrast, it is
the precise goal of peyote ingestion in American Indian religious ceremonies-
the case for permitting courts to displace legislative judgment weakens. And,
of course, it is often mere speculation to say what a legislature "would have
done" in an arguably similar case.
34. RONALD DwoRKiN, LAW'S EMPIRE 407 (1986).
35. Psalms 146:3.
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whichever one the sovereign people choose, after thorough delibera-
tion, from among the range of perfectly legitimate possibilities-all
of which have costs and benefits.
If the "Free Exercise Clause" is to be amended, it is simply be-
cause "we, the people" believe it prudent to have a judicial check on
legislative discretion when it comes to the question of conduct ex-
emptions. Across the political spectrum stretching from the Chris-
tian Coalition to the American Civil Liberties Union, powerful sen-
timent exists for a constitutional "free exercise" principle authorizing
judges to hold even neutral, general laws to the "compelling interest"
and "least restrictive means" standards. 36  Though I myself have
doubts about whether it is in fact prudent to vest this sort of authority
in the hands of judges, I think that it is a basic constitutional question
that merits the deliberation of the people, after which the matter
ought to be resolved in accordance with their prudential judgment. If
the sovereign people decide that, all things considered, it is best for
judges to be empowered to decide whether a conduct exemption is
warranted in any particular case, then the Constitution should be
brought into line with their judgment-my own doubts regarding its
wisdom notwithstanding.
37
But the way to bring the Constitution into line with the judgment
of the people is not by judicial fiat. Judges certainly should not be
able to confer upon themselves the power to mandate conduct ex-
emptions, even where there is widespread popular support for their
doing so. Rather, the task is one for a free and self-governing people,
36. See Bradley, supra note 10, at 246 (stating that groups, from the "new
right" to the ACLU, denounced the Smith decision based on the Court's dis-
mantling of the "compelling interest" and "least restrictive means" tests to
neutral law of general applicability).
37. As I view the matter, the proper resolution of the issue here is a matter
of what Aquinas labeled determinatio-that is, the definitive choosing by sov-
ereign authority among reasonable but mutually incompatible possible ways of
serving the common good of political society-and distinguished from the
straightforward derivation, by a process akin to "deduction," of constitutional
or other positive law standards from the principles of natural law or natural
justice. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW (Summa Theologiae,
Question 95, a.2). See also JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS 267-71 (1998); ROBERT P.
GEORGE, Natural Law and Positive Law, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS
ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 327-30 (Robert P. George, ed. 1996).
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deliberating and deciding the matter in their sovereign capacity, as
the ultimate human source of constitutional principles.
THE "ESTABLISHMENT" PROBLEM
I said at the beginning that I was more confident of my view that
it is necessary to amend the "Establishment Clause." It is time for
me to say why. Thomas Jefferson suggested the possibility of hold-
ing a constitutional convention every twenty years or so in order to
permit each generation to establish a framework of government and
set of constitutional principles that it judges to be suitable to the
times.38 Jefferson's suggestion was extreme, but there is a kernel of
wisdom in it. Even the most perfect constitutions of government will
necessarily mix timeless truths of political morality with principles
and policies devised to deal with contingent historical circumstances
whose passing can render those principles and policies inapposite
and even irrelevant. In my view, the requirement of governmental
respect and protection for religious liberty is a timeless truth.39 By
contrast, the words "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion,"40 enacted a policy designed to deal with a
set of circumstances that arose as a contingent matter of historical
fact at the time of the American founding, but which no longer re-
mains. The passing of these circumstances renders the so-called
38. See Letter From Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12,
1816), in BASIC WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 751 (Philip S. Foner ed.
1944).
39. See Robert P. George, Religious Liberty and Political Morality, in WE
HOLD THESE TRUTHs AND MORE: REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN
PRoPOsION (1993). That for most of human history, as in some places today,
the obligation to respect religious freedom was, and is, not recognized as a
truth at all is not determinative. To say of a certain proposition that it states a
"timeless truth" is to make a normative claim-a claim about what people
ought to do or ought to have done; it is not to make an historical or other de-
scriptive claim about what people do or have done. The truth of a morally
normative proposition simply does not depend on people's acknowledgment of
it or their willingness to conform their actions to the requirements it states-
just as the truth of a descriptive claim about human behavior does not depend
on whether people should engage, or should have engaged, in the behavior it de-
scribes.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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"Establishment Clause" of the Constitution effectively irrelevant to
contemporary problems.
This is by no means to assert that we should have an established
religion in the United States or that there should be no constitutional
prohibition of establishments of religion. Nor is it to suggest that the
question of the place of religion in American public life, or the
proper relationship between church and state, is no longer important.
Nor is it to claim that the Constitution ought to be silent on this
question. It is merely to say that the "Establishment Clause" of the
First Amendment no longer offers any effective guidance to judges
and other constitutional interpreters for the simple reason that it was
framed to deal with circumstances which have long since faded into
the past.
When judges and other interpreters today purport to be guided
by the Clause's terms, they are, at best, deceiving themselves. They
do not extract meaning from the "Establishment Clause," but, rather,
invoke the Clause to justify resolutions they favor to specific prob-
lems of the relationship between religion and public institutions, for
reasons having nothing to do with that clause or any other constitu-
tional provision. In practice, 'this means that courts, and, ultimately,
the Supreme Court of the United States, have come to enjoy a tre-
mendous measure of essentially legislative power to establish the
terms of the relationship between church and state. Some people, of
course, think this is a very good thing. I do not. But even if they are
right and I am wrong about the proper scope of judicial power in this
area, surely it is not right or good for courts to exercise broad legis-
lative power in this or any other area in the absence of a constitu-
tional grant of power. So, at a minimum, the Constitution should be
amended to ratify what has become the status quo: judges should be
more or less explicitly granted authority to settle questions regarding
the relationship of religion and public life according to their best
lights.
Of course, some people contend that this is what the "Establish-
ment Clause," as it stands, is meant to do. They will allow, perhaps,
that courts have made some poor decisions in exercising the power
the Clause grants to them, but they insist that this does not mean
judges have not been granted the power. Anyone granted power un-
der a Constitution may, alas, exercise it unwisely or even unjustly. In
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any event, one might argue, whether or not the courts have under-
stood the "Establishment Clause" properly, it is certainly not devoid
of meaning today. It is, in fact, capable of guiding judges and other
interpreters. Historical developments have not rendered it inapposite
or irrelevant to contemporary questions of church and state.
Now, when it comes to the meaning of the "Establishment
Clause," protests will be lodged against me by liberals and conserva-
tives alike. Liberals and conservatives sharply differ as to what guid-
ance they believe the "Establishment Clause" gives to judges; but
they agree that the Clause gives guidance. As is the case with the
"Free Exercise Clause," each side argues that historical research
vindicates its view as the one most faithful to the intentions of the
Framers and Ratifiers.
As we have seen, division over the meaning of the "Free Exer-
cise Clause" does not necessarily break out along conventional ideo-
logical lines. Division over the meaning of the "Establishment
Clause," by contrast, does. The standard liberal view is that the
Clause demands the "strict separation" of church and state. 4 1 It for-
bids all state aid to religion--even if the state makes aid available to
religious groups and institutions in an evenhanded manner.42 It re-
quires a governmental policy of strict neutrality not only as between
different religious views, but also with respect to religion itself.
Government-federal, state, and local-must neither favor nor disfa-
vor religion. It may not deliberately impede religious practice, but
neither may it promote or encourage religion in any way.43 Govern-
ment must be neutral not only between Catholicism and Protestant-
ism, and between Christianity and Judaism, but also between belief
and unbelief, between, for example, ethical monotheism and atheistic
materialism.
The conventional conservative view also interprets the "Estab-
lishment Clause" as requiring a sort of neutrality, but not the strict
separation-or, no governmental support for religion-demanded by
41. See Andrew Rotstein, Good Faith? Religious-Secular Parallelism and
the "Establishment Clause, " 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1763, 1775-76 (1993).
42. See id. at 1776.
43. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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liberalism.44 Conservatives believe the Clause calls for governmen-
tal evenhandedness as between religious groups, but permits a favor-
able posture toward religion in general by federal, state, and local
government.45 They argue that the nation's founding principles and
constitutional ideals-above all the belief in God-given natural
rights-are themselves expressions of the tradition of ethical mono-
theism: Americans are, as Justice William 0. Douglas-himself
hardly a conservative! -wrote in the case of Zorach v. Clauson,46 "a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."
4 7
In its first great "Establishment Clause" case, Everson v. Board
of Education,48 a decision handed down more than one hundred and
fifty years after the ratification of the First Amendment, the Supreme
Court adopted the liberal view. It did so squarely on the basis of an
appeal to the original intent of the Framers, which it supported by
reference to historical materials and putative historical facts.
49 Al-
though, since Everson, the Court has held back from rigorously ap-
plying the "strict separationist" doctrine it declared in that case, it has
never abandoned its official adherence to that doctrine. While the
Justices have over the years invented various tests by which to dis-
tinguish permissible from impermissible governmental religious ex-
pression or involvement with religion-the most significant of these
being the three-pronged test of Lemon v. Kurtzman5 -the official ju-
risprudence continues to damn any governmental support for or en-
dorsement- of religion.
Many commentators have exposed errors in Everson's historiog-
raphy and, more importantly, its general approach to the "Establish-
ment Clause." I will not rehash these errors here. Anyone interested
should consult Gerard V. Bradley's Church-State Relationships in
America51 and Robert Cord's Separation of Church and State.52
44. See Rotstein, supra note 40, at 1776-77.
45. See Dina F. EI-Sayed, What Is the Court Trying to Establish?: An
Analysis ofLee v. Weisman, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441,454 (1994).
46. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
47. Id. at313.
48. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
49. See id. at 8-15.
50. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
51. GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA
(1987).
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These works will tell you why the Court was wrong to suppose the
"Establishment Clause" meant what the majority and the dissent in
Everson said that it meant, namely, that government may not favor or
support religion. I will tell you what the Clause did mean.
It is important to recall that at the time of the founding, several
of the states-probably a majority-had established churches, or
"state" churches. These religious establishments endured well into
the nineteenth century. The disestablishment of state churches was
ultimately effected, not by the intervention of federal courts, but by
the actions of the states themselves. Far from prohibiting the estab-
lishment of religions by the individual states, the "Establishment
Clause" protected these establishments. More precisely, the Clause
protected the authority of the states to establish religions against fed-
eral efforts to disestablish state churches, or to set up a competing
national establishment.53 The words "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion ' 54 neatly and concisely for-
bade both a federally established church and federal interference with
churches established by the states.
The key words here are "respecting an." Because of the pres-
ence of these words, the Clause cannot be interpreted simply as for-
bidding a national established church, similar to the Church of
52. See CORD, supra note 15.
53. Among the scholars who have come to accept this interpretation of the
"Establishment Clause," at least as a matter of its original purpose and under-
standing, are Akhil Reed Amar, Stephen L. Carter, and M. Stanton Evans. See
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
30-40 (1998); STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRiVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 118 (1993);
M. STANTON EVANS, THE THEME IS FREEDOM: RELIGION, POLITICS AND THE
AMERICAN TRADITION 284 (1994). Do you doubt this interpretation could be
sound? Please join me in a little thought experiment: Imagine that it is 1805
and Congress enacts legislation purporting to disestablish the Congregational
Church in New Hampshire. The solicitor general for the State files a constitu-
tional challenge to congressional authority to disestablish its Church. He de-
nies that Congress was delegated a power by the Constitution to interfere with
establishments of religion in the states. Can he go further? Can he cite a pro-
vision of the Constitution expressly denying such a power to the federal gov-
ernment? It is plain that he can: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion."
54. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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England. The Clause plainly forbids something more than that. But
what, precisely, is the "something more" that it forbids?
Liberals say the "something more" is any government promo-
tion of religion. Conservatives say the "something more" is govern-
ment favoritism as between different religious groups.55 But both of
these views are pure invention. Both appeal to the words "respecting
an," not in an effort to be guided by them, but merely as a rationali-
zation for imposing by judicial fiat the policies they prefer. Neither
the liberal nor the conservative view makes any sense of the words
"respecting an," which meant in 1791 exactly what they mean to-
day-namely, "regarding," "concerning," "having to do with,"
"touching upon," etc. If we take these words seriously, that is to say,
if we take the "Establishment Clause" seriously-since it, like other
constitutional provisions, is made of words and means what the
words mean-then it is clear that the restraint on government power,
beyond the prohibition of a national church, has to do with the pro-
tection against the federal government of the authority of states not
merely to promote religion in general, but to establish churches.
56
But what about the Fourteenth Amendment, and, particularly,
the idea that it "incorporates," and, thus, makes applicable to the
states key guarantees of the Bill of Rights which originally applied
only against the federal government? Is it not the case that the origi-
nal meaning of the "Establishment Clause" has been effectively
transformed by the Fourteenth Amendment into a prohibition on the
states akin precisely to its original prohibition on federal power with
55. See John W. Huleatt, Accommodation or Endorsement? Stark v. Inde-
pendent School District: Caught in the Tangle of Establishment Clause
Chaos, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 657, 659 (1998) (discussing the differing views
of separationists and nonpreferentialists).
56. In saying this, I do not mean to imply a strict "moral equivalence" be-
tween the liberal and conservative readings of the "Establishment Clause."
Despite its failings, the conservative interpretation has two significant advan-
tages over the liberal alternative. First, it is faithful to the original under-
standing of the obligations of the federal government to be evenhanded in its
treatment of religions in United States territories where it exercises police
powers as the government of general jurisdiction. Second, and relatedly, it un-
derstands the concept of "establishment" correctly, even if it does not grasp the
crucial significance of the words "respecting an." The liberal interpretation
both misses the point of these words and misunderstands what the American
founders meant by religious "establishment(s)."
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respect to religious establishments? Whatever is to be said for the
"incorporation doctrine" as applied to other provisions of the Bill of
Rights--especially those provisions which constitute guarantees of
personal immunities against, for example, prohibition of the free ex-
ercise of religion, abridgement of the freedom of speech, and denial
of trial by jury-it is, as Gerard Bradley has astutely observed, sim-
ply inapplicable to the "Establishment Clause., 57 It is logically im-
possible to incorporate and apply against a state a provision whose
purpose is to preserve the state's prerogative. Incorporating the "Es-
tablishment Clause" is, as Bradley says, directly analogous to trying
to incorporate and apply against the states the Tenth Amendment's
reservation to the states of powers not delegated to the federal gov-
ernment by the Constitution.58 Logically, it makes no sense.59
Please notice that I do not propose a wholesale attack on the
"incorporation doctrine." For purposes of this discussion, let us sim-
ply prescind from questions of the doctrine's validity with respect to
other provisions of the Bill of Rights. My point is that even granting
its soundness elsewhere, incorporation cannot possibly apply to the
"Establishment Clause" once the plain meaning of that clause is
brought into focus.
It follows from what I have said that, properly understood, the
"Establishment Clause," far from forbidding even full-blown estab-
lishments of religion in the states, protects the prerogative of the
57. See Bradley, supra note 50, at 95.
58. See id.
59. Here I must mention-though it would take a separate article to do a
responsible critique of-the effort of Professor Kurt T. Lash of Loyola Law
School of Los Angeles to show that throughout the period leading up to the
framing and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, "the general under-
standing was that any law which supported or suppressed religion as religion
violated the nonestablishment principle that government has no power over re-
ligion as such." Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the "Establishment
Clause ": The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1085,
1140-41 (1995). Although the concept that government has no power over re-
ligion is itself problematic and somewhat opaque, Lash deploys it in an effort
to show that it was at least logically possible for the Framers and Ratifiers to
incorporate and make applicable to the states a revised understanding, possi-
bly, indeed, a misunderstanding, of the original "Establishment Clause." I am
doubtful as to whether the evidence Lash is able to adduce is sufficient to bear
the great weight of his claim. Nevertheless, I would urge readers to consult
Lash's article and carefully consider that evidence.
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states to establish churches. This, it will be objected, runs so pro-
foundly contrary to contemporary American sensibilities as to dis-
qualify it as an interpretation. However faithful my interpretation
may be to the constitutional text, understood in historical context, my
critics will say, no court would, should, or could adopt such an inter-
pretation. The people would not stand for it.
Of course, I agree that the idea of established churches is anath-
ema to contemporary Americans. (Indeed, I share the view that dis-
establishment was a good idea and I would oppose any effort to es-
tablish a national church or churches in the states.). What this shows,
however, is that a constitutional guarantee of nonestablishment is not
particularly salient at the moment. It is the settled and overwhelming
public sentiment against religious establishments-and not the "Es-
tablishment Clause" or any other constitutional provision-which
accounts for the absence of serious movements to establish churches
in the states. Still, I have no objection to amending the Constitution
expressly to prohibit state establishments. Nonestablishment is good
policy and is entirely consistent with the constitutional will of the
people. My point is simply that the actual words of the Constitution
do not prohibit establishments and ought not to be misinterpreted as
doing so. Such a misinterpretation strips the words of any power to
guide judicial reasoning, effectively licensing judges to enact their
own preferences as a purely legislative matter under the guise of
giving effect to written constitutional guarantees.
Both the liberal and conservative views-sometimes called
"strict separationism" and "non-preferentialism"--are poor constitu-
tional interpretation, or, rather, are not constitutional interpretation at
all; but they do represent two serious alternative norms of prudence
and political morality for structuring the relationship between gov-
ernment and religion in ways stricter than what the Constitution as it
stands actually allows. The decision between the non-preferentialist
and strict separationist perspectives should not be left to the judici-
ary. There is no reason in principle or practice why judges are more
likely than the people as a whole to choose more wisely or justly. As
in the case of the "free exercise" problem--only more urgently-it is
time for a grand national debate and constitutional resolution of the
question of the proper relationship between church and state.
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My own voice in this debate will be raised on the side of non-
preferentialism. The national government and the states ought to be
entitled to give due recognition to God as the truly ultimate source of
the dignity of human beings, and, thus, of our most cherished rights
and freedoms, as well as our basic moral obligations. Although I be-
lieve that government in a society such as ours ought to strive to be
evenhanded in its treatment of various religious groups, I do not fa-
vor a policy of neutrality as between belief and unbelief or ethical
monotheism and atheistic materialism. There is, in my view, pro-
found truth in Justice Douglas' claim that the very institutions of our
government and civil society presuppose a Supreme Being.60 Unbe-
lievers should not be persecuted or made to suffer political disabili-
ties, for that would be an unjust imposition upon their freedom. Tol-
eration of unbelief is perfectly consistent with an official policy of
favor towards religion. But, by the same token, respect for the free-
dom of unbelievers does not require governmental neutrality as be-
tween belief and unbelief.
When it comes to questions of financial aid to religious institu-
tions, the "strict separationist" position has appeal, though, in the
end, I think it should be rejected here, too. The appeal lies in the idea
that a policy of "no support" for religion would prevent the unfair-
ness and divisiveness that, many people contend, would attend an in-
evitable competition among religious groups for scarce governmental
funds, as well as the idea that people ought not to be taxed to support
religious institutions whose faith they do not share.61
60. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
61. Fear of a divisive competition for public funds seems plainly to have
been on the minds of several justices in Everson. See SIDNEY FINE, FRANK
MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON YEARS 568-69 (1984). According to Fine, fol-
lowing the justices' conference in Everson, J. Wiley Rutledge drew up a long
memorandum expressing a deep concern about the case. He wrote,
"We all know that this is ... really a fight by the Catholic schools to
secure this money from the public treasury. It is aggressive and on a
wide scale" and clearly intended to encourage children to attend re-
ligious schools.... He feared that if the lower court decision were af-
firmed, religious groups would zealously press their demands in the
state legislatures, and he thought that "the worst thing that could hap-
pen to this country would be to throw its religious demands, finan-
cially speaking, into politics."
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There are, however, in my view, two enormous problems with
the "no support" perspective. First, it ends up effectively, and un-
justly, "privatizing" religion and pushing it to the margins.62 Given
the enormous expansion of governmental involvement in matters of
health, education, and welfare, secularization is the inevitable result
of a policy that says religion must retreat whenever government, or
government support, enters the picture. 63 Second, and relatedly, re-
ligion and religious faith end up becoming victims of discrimination
in the marketplace of ideas. Secular philosophical or ideological
views that directly compete with religious views are eligible for sup-
port, and are thus advantaged, while religious views are treated as in-
eligible. Many people-and, though my own children attend public
schools, I am one of them-perceive serious discrimination and in-
justice in a system in which religion is disabled from competing with
secular ideological views in schools which are funded by tax dollars.
Given the secularist ideology that prevails in many schools and other
public institutions,64 we find no comfort in the claim that the "no
support" doctrine prevents unfair favoritism in public institutions.
Secularism is not neutrality.65 It is, to borrow John Rawls' terms-
though he might not appreciate my doing so for these purposes-a
"comprehensive view"--a view about values and virtues, about
62. On the privatization of religion as the motive and "governing norm" of
the Supreme Court's strict separationist jurisprudence, see Gerard V. Bradley,
Dogmatomachy--A "Privatization" Theory of the Religion Clause Cases, 30
ST. Louis U. L.J. 275, 301-09 (1986).
63. See Neuhaus, supra note 1, at 16.
64. If you doubt that secularist ideology in fact prevails in many public
schools or that public school textbooks and curricula are often shaped by
secularist assumptions, I urge you to consult the most careful and comprehen-
sive recent study of the subject: WARREN A. NORD, RELIGION AND AMERICAN
EDUCATION: RETHINKING A NATIONAL DILEMMA 138-91 (1995); see also
Charles L. Glenn, Religion, Textbooks, and the Common School, THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, Summer 1987, at 28 (examining the difficulty in creating a model of
public education satisfactory to the beliefs and demands of all parents). These
works should be read in light of J.S. Mill's prescient analysis of the dangers of
placing "the whole or any large part of the education of the people... in State
hands." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 119 (Prometheus Books 1986)
(1859).
65. See J. Budziszewski, The Illusion of Moral Neutrality, FIRST THINGS,
Aug.-Sept. 1993, at 32.
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human nature, duty, and destiny-which competes with other "com-
prehensive views," including religious views, for people's funda-
mental allegiance.
66
Nor should we credit the idea that secularism prevents divisive-
ness. It could do that only if religious believers were to capitulate to
its claims to be the legitimate "public philosophy" of the United
States. But precisely because a great many believers-rightly-re-
ject the idea that secularism is "neutral," they will-rightly-refuse
to capitulate to it. Far from being a shield against strife, a "no sup-
port" view that effectively establishes secularism as the state religion
will itself become-indeed it has become-a cause of social divi-
sion. This is not to suggest that the "non-preferentialist" alternative
will eliminate religiously or philosophically based social division.
Given the profound differences in our society over many basic issues
of morality and justice, no policy that any responsible person would
care to endorse could accomplish that. It is only to say that non-
preferentialism is no more divisive than "strict separationism," and it
is fairer and truer to our nation's founding principles.
CONCLUSION
We should not imagine that the American people no longer pos-
sess the intellectual or moral virtues required to deliberate wisely
about what John Rawls calls "constitutional essentials and questions
of basic justice." 67 We should not fear a grand constitutional de-
bate. 68 Let us, as a self-governing people, decide whether to amend
66. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). The author explores
"comprehensive views" in political theory, and attempts to develop and defend
a purely "political" liberalism that does not constitute or appeal to any particu-
lar "comprehensive view." See, e.g., id. at 13, 177. "Political" liberalism may
be affirmed by partisans of various reasonable competing "comprehensive
views" who join an "overlapping consensus." Id. at 150-52. But see Robert P.
George, Public Reason and Political Conflict: Abortion and Homosexuality,
106 YALE L.J. 2475 (1997) and Heidi M. Hurd, The Levitation of Liberalism,
105 YALE L.J. 795 (1995) (arguing that Rawls' efforts fail).
67. RAWLS, supra note 66, at 227-30.
68. From our very different moral and political vantage points, Sanford
Levinson and I have converged on at least this conclusion. I would recom-
mend to readers who tend to view the world his way rather than mine the pow-
erful argument he advances in his article, A Constitutional Convention: Does
the Left Fear Popular Sovereignty?, DISSENT, Winter 1996, at 27.
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the "Free Exercise Clause" and how to amend the "Establishment
Clause." Let us soberly consider the proper scope of judicial power
in the cause of protecting religious freedom. Let us identify princi-
ples to maximize the accommodation of people's free exercise of
religion, consistent with the religious freedom of others, and the just
authority of the people, through their elected representatives, to act to
protect public health, safety, and morals, and to advance the general
welfare.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:27
